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I
n March 2006, the Board of Governors ceased reporting the
monetary aggregate M3, which consisted of M2 plus items
such as large time deposits, overnight and term repurchase
agreements, and overnight and term Eurodollar deposits.1
One reason was the costs of collecting data on the deposit
series special to M3. But the deeper reason is that M3 has not
proved essential for policymaking and monetary analysis. M3
never caught on as a popular measure of broad money. Econo-
mists prefer to study M2 (only two-thirds the size of M3).2 This
preference may seem puzzling. With such a wide variety of
financial instruments, wouldn’t it be desirable to focus on as
broad a measure of money as possible? And if policymakers
don’t keep track of growth in those instruments, do they run
the risk of overlooking a source of aggregate demand pressure
that might undo monetary policy actions?
When the Board began reporting the M3 aggregate in 1980,
a widespread answer to these questions may have been “yes.”
Now, however, it is predominantly “no.” This reversal reflects
a reconsideration of the two issues involved: (i) the appropriate
definition of money and (ii) the implications of diverse financial
instruments for the effectiveness of monetary policy.
A broader definition of money is not necessarily always
preferable. Most theories of money-holding involve alternative
assets that are not money but have some of its characteristics.
Monetary analysis needs to draw the line between money and
nonmoney assets, and some financial instruments lack sufficient
similarities with traditional money to merit inclusion in a mone-
tary aggregate. In some cases, including new assets in the defi-
nition of money has merit, especially if backed up by market
information on how they’re used. But simply pointing to the
existence of many financial assets doesn’t justify using a very
broad monetary aggregate.
How new financial instruments might affect monetary policy
concerned economists during the 1960s and 1970s. Some argued
that the financial intermediaries competing with traditional banks
would erode monetary policy effectiveness. For example, when
a monetary policy tightening reduced growth in banks’ balance
sheets, the new financial intermediaries might take up the busi-
ness (loans and deposits) lost in the contraction of banking activ-
ity and thus frustrate the attempt to influence aggregate demand.3
In November 1979, at a time when this concern reached its high
point, the New York Times reported that the Federal Reserve and
other central banks had a plan for “controlling the explosive
growth of the Eurocurrency markets, which they believe is fuel-
ing world inflation”—and Eurocurrency deposits became a key
component of the M3 aggregate.
This argument has subsequently lost its influence. Nonbanks
are competitors with banks, but it does not follow that they will
take up all the business forgone by banks when monetary policy
tightens. Modern monetary policy is implemented by open market
operations, which trigger interest-rate movements, and the business
of banks and nonbanks alike is sensitive to these changes. There-
fore, in the wake of the Fed’s open market sales, these institutions
all have incentives to reduce their expansion. This reduction is an
equilibrium reaction to the signals given by prices and yields of
financial assets, not a reduction imposed by regulatory fiat.
The “judge and jury” on whether monetary authorities have
lost their effectiveness in the face of financial innovation must
be whether the Federal Reserve can still use the federal funds rate
as an instrument. If the private sector could truly defy a monetary
policy tightening, the Fed’s attempts to use the federal funds rate
would be continually frustrated: the financial system could create
money substitutes by just the amount sufficient to offset the Fed’s
influence on the federal funds market. But the Fed has, in fact,
continued to be able to control the funds rate.
The fear of expanded financial intermediation voiced during the
1960s and 1970s has therefore been refuted; likewise, the need to
keep track of aggregates as broad as M3 has subsided. Indeed, even
in the 1960s the view that financial innovations would wipe out the
effectiveness of monetary policy was not universal. As early as
1966, one analyst voiced “substantial doubt on the hypothesis that
the growth of financial intermediaries may reduce the effectiveness
of monetary policy,” instead concluding that “the existence of these
institutions should contribute to a broader distribution of the effects
of monetary policy.”4 And if that judgment was accurate in 1966,
it must hold even more true when applied to the vastly more diver-
sified and liberalized financial environment of forty years later.
—Edward Nelson
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